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Abstract
New Value-Added Network Services (VANS) provide the foundation for the wide variety of 
applications (e-commerce, e-government, e-education, etc.,) that will make-up the e-economy in 
new information societies. Internet services are only a part of the VANS sector. The development of 
VANS is influenced primarily by three factors – technological improvements, government policies/
regulations, and the market structure of the VANS sector. South Africa has announced clear 
information society policies, but has not yet implemented them. Although the national fixed telecom 
network has experienced declining coverage in recent years, for those connected, the network is 
fully digitalised and makes increasing use of Internet Protocol. Technologically, South Africa is 
well prepared to be a leader in VANS development. However, its policy and regulation arena has 
been a site of continuous conflict and indecision, which has resulted in VANS development being 
restricted rather than promoted by government policy. Telkom’s aggressive activity in attempting 
to maximise its service exclusivities has restricted VANS development even further. Telkom’s 
exclusivity period under the government’s “managed liberalisation” policy ended 7 May 2002. If 
South Africa is to see its information society and e-economy policies implemented, it will have to 
establish, and implement through strong regulation, a commitment to promoting an innovative 
VANS sector. The forthcoming convergence legislation provides an opportunity to do so.
1. Introduction
After a decade of policy declarations by national governments and international organisations, and 
two years of preparation, the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) convened in Geneva 
in December 2003 to confirm the profound importance and significance of electronic information 
networks to 21st Century economies and societies. In practice, the information societies evolve 
by the development and application of new electronic communication services that make possible 
advanced information exchanges. These in turn can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
organisations and individuals by orders of magnitude. In its various areas of development and 
application, this activity has been given such labels as “electronic commerce,” “e- banking,” “e-
education,” “e-government” and the “e-economy.” Today the “e”-prefix is everywhere.
Most people think of the new “e-services” as Internet services, because most individuals access 
them via the Internet. But there are many additional services that are provided as private networks 
to facilitate the management of firms, industries, government agencies and other organisations. 
The increasing number and variety of specific services are more precisely and comprehensively 
described as “Value-Added Network Services (VANS),” or in some countries, “Enhanced Services.” 
As the names suggest, they are services that provide advanced functionality beyond conventional 
public voice telephone services. The advanced functionality typically involves digital communication 
of data, pictures, sound, higher quality voice, etc., depending upon the requirements of particular 
network applications for specific customers, e.g., buying tickets to a performance, registering for a 
university course, filing tax forms.
Perhaps the most easily recognised widespread application of the new e-services is in banking and 
finance (ATMs) and retail sales (point-of-sale terminals). However, the major applications of VANS 
are to improve internal management and service capabilities, i.e., communication and information 
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linkage with customers, suppliers and partners of organisations of all sizes. Applications of 
VANS permit firms in every sector of the economy to manage more efficiently and to extend the 
geographic and product-line limitations of their markets, thereby tending to increase competitive 
opportunities, including exports, wherever they are adopted.
In this new environment where organisations, industries and government agencies are all working 
feverishly to develop and implement appropriate e-services, their opportunities are influenced 
primarily by the capabilities of the VANS market sector – the services this sector provides or 
can provide, its efficiency and price levels, and its continuing innovativeness in applying new 
technologies that enable new and improved e-services.
VANS provide the e-service foundations for e-services applications everywhere. They provide the 
essential specialised communication networks upon which firms, industries, government agencies, 
educational institutions and others can develop their own special services and become “e-enabled.” 
The preparedness of a country to move ahead in the development and application of information 
society services depends very much on the conditions in its VANS sector. For that reason this 
article examines VANS sector development in South Africa in light of developments in leading “e-
applications” countries, and suggests steps that might be taken to increase its innovativeness in 
preparing the foundations for South Africa’s new information society.
2.  Factors Shaping VANS Sector Development
The development of VANS is influenced primarily by three factors:
1. continuing technological improvements (mostly software) that enhance the capabilities and 
reduce the costs of services on the telecom network, and enhance the terminals attached to 
the network;
2. government policies and regulations promoting and/or restricting the development of VANS; 
and
3. the market structure of the VANS sector – its competitiveness and innovation, and barriers to 
entry and participation.
For the most part, the major technological advances are developed in global markets and 
provide opportunities for rapid global diffusion, as illustrated by the Internet. Developing country 
opportunities for employing these new technologies are restricted by their affordability (in light of 
the vastly fewer resources they have available), and, in some countries, by self-defeating import 
duties and taxes. The “digital divide” is not a technological divide; it is an economic and policy 
divide.
Government policy and regulation influence VANS sector development in several ways. Although 
most countries have made World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments to un-bundle their 
telecom network facilities and services sectors, and to liberalise trade in services, there is a vast 
difference among countries in the speed of their telecom reforms and the effectiveness of their 
implementation. The extent to which national government policy and regulation have removed 
restrictions and opened opportunities for VANS development varies significantly across countries. 
Some countries encourage new entry into the VANS market; some discourage it. The effectiveness 
of the telecom regulator has been a major factor determining the dynamics and growth of the VANS 
sector in various countries.
The VANS sector is a relatively recent creation – a creation of the telecom reform process underway 
in most countries. Not too many years ago, telecom service provision was a government monopoly. 
VANS and the Internet have been made possible by an un-bundling of telecom network facilities 
from the services provided over those facilities. Today, incumbent telecom operators, like Telkom 
in South Africa, tend to dominate the provision of network facilities and are also major players in 
the provision of VANS and Internet services. But the vast majority of innovation and new market 
development in these services has come from the new entrants to the sector. In some countries the 
anti-competitive behaviour of the incumbent operator, and market barriers to entry, have restricted 
opportunities for innovation and market development, while in others a dynamic and progressive 
market has developed. The market environment has been a key factor in determining the size, 
structure and innovative capabilities of the VANS sector in different countries. As a result, VANS 
development in many countries is also influenced by the effectiveness of national competition 
authorities in overseeing the VANS sector and ensuring that the monopoly power of the incumbent 
telecom operator does not impair innovation in the VANS sector. 
Finally, national governments in many countries are investing heavily in the transformation of 
government agencies at all levels, and small and medium-sized business, to become e-enabled. 
This creates demand for VANS and can provide a major stimulus for innovation in the sector. But 
this can only be effective if the other factors shaping VANS sector development have provided the 
dynamic market environment needed for innovation.
3.  The Evolution of VANS
3.1  Separate and Distinct Services
The inherited telecom networks around the world were designed for a single service: voice 
communication. The basic technology, analogue transmission, was suited to voice communication, 
and telephone monopolies provided both the network facilities and services for a public switched 
telephone service (PSTS), as it is called in South Africa. The introduction of digital technologies 
provided the possibility of reducing any form of communication – voice, data, graphics, music, 
video – to “bits” for transmission and re-assembly at an appropriate receiving terminal. The gradual 
transition from analogue to digital technologies in telecom network facilities, terminal equipment 
and information content has been underway since the 1960s. 
The opportunities provided by digital technology were a driving force behind the un-bundling of 
the telecom equipment market (including customer terminals) and the telecom service provision 
market from the monopoly control of incumbent telecom operators. On digital telecom networks, 
there can be many other communication services in addition to voice telephony that can be 
provided, and many other firms wishing to provide them. The first stage of liberalisation of telecom 
service provision, implemented initially in the US in the 1970s and Europe in the 1980s, was to 
differentiate between the traditional voice PSTS and the new services. The new services added 
value over basic voice service and so were labelled “value-added” (VANS) or “enhanced.” In most 
countries, the PSTS -- the basic public voice service -- has been reserved by policy and regulation 
as a monopoly service of the incumbent operator for a limited period, while VANS have been fully 
liberalised fairly rapidly.
3.2  Implications of Convergence
When VANS were initially established, a clear distinction could be drawn between the PSTS, which 
provided a general public service of specified standards and quality, and VANS, which provided 
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specialised services, often with different standards, quality, service characteristics and network 
management. VANS are most typically provided as private networks for particular organisations, 
industry groups, etc. VANS providers typically lease all or most of their network capacity from 
the incumbent telecom operator or other providers of network facilities as a key resource input 
in constructing their VANS offerings. VANS represent a wholesale business for incumbent 
operators.
The classification of telecom services called VANS was established to differentiate between the 
provision of the basic public voice services and specialised services that are not offered to the 
general public, and which frequently include data and other non-voice specifications. In every case, 
including South Africa, the purpose has been to create special conditions that will define a step in 
the direction of liberalising markets for all services in the telecom industry. At the beginning of the 
process, there is typically a national telecom monopoly (e.g., Telkom). At the end of the process, 
full market liberalisation is foreseen, in the sense that no monopoly markets will be reserved by 
law, and legal barriers to entry that restrict competition will have been removed. The interim period 
is one of gradual market liberalisation. For example, South Africa established a policy of “managed 
liberalisation” in the sector in 1997, anticipating that after completion of five years of limited legal 
protection for Telkom in the provision of certain facilities and services, this period of protection 
would end, and greatly increased competition would be permitted from May 2002. 
In many countries, VANS providers have been able to manage the communication capacity they 
lease from the incumbent telecom operator in any way they choose, in order to provide any form of 
communication service, including voice. In other countries, the provision of all voice communication 
has been reserved to the incumbent operator for a period, and VANS have been restricted to the 
provision of data services and value-added network management functions. In the most restrictive 
cases, a few countries, such as South Africa, have required that, in addition, VANS must lease their 
network facilities from the incumbent operator for a period.
But as the convergence of information and communication technologies has progressed, these 
restrictions on VANS have proven to be self-defeating, as they prevent the provision of converged 
voice and non-voice communication signals in the same service. Given that converged services 
are essential for the provision of e-services of all kinds, such restrictions have been major barriers 
to the development of essential VANS and the general e-economy.
4.  VANS in South Africa in 2003
4.1  Information Society Policy Support
The effective application of information and communication technologies (ICT) is by now widely 
recognised as the foundation for 21st Century e-economies. South African President Thabo 
Mbeki identified this as early as 1995 when, as Deputy-President, he hosted the first G7 meeting 
in the South on the “Information Society and Development.” Subsequently, President Mbeki has 
established both a Presidential National Commission, and an International Advisory Council, on the 
Information Society and Development, and has made ICT a key element in the continental platform 
of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In his 2002 State of the Nation Address, 
President Mbeki emphasised that “a critical and pervasive element in economic development in the 
current age is the optimum utilisation of information and communications technology.”
Several government departments have established ICT initiatives, including e-commerce and e-
government promotion programmes, and the Department of Communications is currently leading 
a process to develop new convergence legislation encompassing telecom, broadcasting and 
information technology.
The scope for application of e-economy services is determined in the first instance by the extent of 
the coverage of the telecom network. This is the information infrastructure. Obviously, the benefits 
from the e-economy can only be realised by those connected to the network. In most developed 
countries, the telecom network provides a virtually universal basic service, and the policy concern 
is focussed on extending broadband capacity universally. In developing countries, basic telephone 
network connections do not extend to the majority of the population. 
South Africa is much better off than most developing countries in this respect, but still provides 
only about 10 lines per 100 people, and connects only about 30% of households on its fixed 
network. Large areas of the country, and many small and medium-sized businesses, remain vastly 
underserved. Mobile phone penetration is about triple that of fixed-line penetration, but most of it 
is pre-paid voice, and the nature of this mobile cellular technology -- and the costs associated with 
high-bandwidth usage of it -- inhibit its use for e-economy development in a significant way. For 
the immediate future, the great majority of South Africans will not be able to participate in the e-
economy simply because they are not connected to the fixed telecom network. The government is 
currently engaged in a process of licensing a Second National Operator (SNO), as well a number 
of regional operators (Under-Serviced Area Licencees, or USALs), which have the potential to 
increase the currently diminishing number of subscribers on fixed networks, but this is likely to 
occur only incrementally as new entrants build their own networks and move off Telkom’s. This 
dimension, however, is not the subject of this article, which is focussing on the development of 
the VANS sector -- the essential sector for e-services once organisations and individuals are 
connected to the network.
4.2  VANS Technological Development
Although Telkom’s network may exclude most South Africans, for those it connects, it provides a 
technologically modern network, including the latest digital technologies. Its network is now entirely 
digitalised, and it is increasingly using Internet Protocol (IP) for its voice services. IP is generally 
regarded as the final step in the digitalisation of telecom networks and the provision of full-services 
convergence. It permits telecom operators to fully integrate their voice and non-voice services, and 
permits the transmission of voice services over the Internet. 
In the United States, some new VANS are providing public voice telephony over the Internet 
using IP (Economist, 2003).  In South Africa, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are technologically 
capable of providing telephone calls over the Internet now. From a technological standpoint, 
full convergence has been achieved, and Telkom is at the forefront in implementing it. In fact, 
technologically, the classification of VANS is no longer relevant. On fully converged telecom 
networks, there are only services of different types. Any provider is capable of providing any 
combination of service characteristics in response to consumer demand.  
4.3  South African Policy & Regulation of VANS
4.3.1  Early Policy Development
Unfortunately, the history of policy and regulation with respect to VANS development in South 
Africa has been characterised by ongoing disputes about the legal definition of VANS, and the 
extent of the restrictions on VANS development put in place in order to protect Telkom during the 
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period of transition to a fully liberalised market. The White Paper on Telecommunications Policy of 
1996 sets out the policy framework for the telecom sector, within the context of the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP). It notes:
 “A new market structure is necessary for the telecommunications sector to orientate 
the sector towards accelerated development and universal service as well as take into 
account technological and international trends. The new market structure entails a period 
of exclusivity for Telkom, after which various telecommunications market segments will be 
liberalised in a phased process put into motion by the Regulator” (RSA, 1996a, pp 14-15).
The policy paradigm for South Africa’s telecom reform involved three elements:
• Privatisation the incumbent monopoly public telecom operator (Telkom);
• Introduction of new entrants to compete in fixed and mobile services as well as value-added 
services (VANS); and
• Establishment of a regulator to oversee the introduction of competition.
The White Paper set up a balance between the exclusivity of Telkom and the phased liberalisation 
of the sector. Telkom had two conflicting requirements: to roll out the network and keep usage 
affordable, and to re-balance its tariffs in order to prepare for competition. To do this, bypass of 
Telkom’s network and the re-sale of capacity were to be controlled, to prevent large-scale migration 
away from Telkom. Bypass of Telkom’s networks by private networks was prohibited, and re-sale 
was to be permitted only in year four of Telkom’s exclusivity period.
The White Paper recognised that the steps taken to protect Telkom against competition while it 
rolled out its advanced network could backfire: 
 “For the most part this chapter on market structure displays a concern to protect Telkom’s 
ability to carry out these central tasks. It is impossible at this time to know the extent and 
strength of competition Telkom will face after the period of exclusivity. If new entrants are 
likely to be cash-rich global operators like AT&T and BT, Telkom will indeed benefit from 
the time it is given to prepare for competition. However, we must articulate a concern on 
the other side, as well. There is a danger, ironically, that the plan succeeds too well, and 
Telkom during the period of exclusivity is able to position itself in such a way that it can 
impede competitive ventures. This has indeed been the case in many other countries, 
where a strong incumbent operator so dominates a liberalised market that the benefits of 
competition are few” (RSA, 1996a, s2.20, p 31).
Due to political concerns about maintaining flexibility in negotiating the sale of a privatisation stake 
in Telkom with prospective strategic equity partners, the Telecommunications Act was finalised 
without the proposed phased liberalisation timetable contained in the White Paper. All such 
prospective dates were left in the Act as subject to the discretion of the Minister. Public hearings 
were held and Telkom’s PSTS, VANS and Frequency Spectrum licences were issued on 7 May 
1997. At the same time, Telkom was partially privatised, with the sale of a 30% shareholding to the 
Thintana consortium -- made up of American firm SBC (18%) and Telekom Malaysia (12%) – and 
the incumbent was granted a five-year period of exclusivity, to end on 7 May 2002. The South 
African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) was established in February 1997, but 
it had no direct role in the finalisation of the Telkom licences, even though it was SATRA that would 
be required to regulate Telkom. 
The key legal instruments for dealing with the disputes that subsequently arose were the 
Telecommunications Act and Telkom’s PSTS and VANS licences. No specific definitions of the 
different telecom services are offered in the Act. Telkom’s PSTS and VANS licences, on the other 
hand, do offer definitions of PSTS and VANS, although both definitions are more of the nature of 
lists of types of services falling under each licence category, rather than generic definitions.
Telkom’s PSTS licence does contain a number of conditions giving Telkom the right to contractually 
bind VANS providers -- under circumstances which are not identical to those set out in the Act. 
These conditions include a requirement for VANS to obtain telecom facilities from Telkom 
exclusively, and to not re-sell that capacity. The licence also stipulates that VANS may not offer 
voice services, because VANS services must have value-added components and must not in any 
way prompt or assist users to bypass the PSTS. 
Similarly, Telkom’s licence sets out a number of circumstances in which Telkom is not obliged to 
provide telecommunication services, and these particular provisions appear to contradict Telkom’s 
obligations in the Act with respect to facilities leasing. 
SATRA published interim guidelines for licensing VANS and private networks, but failed to 
complete its VANS regulation-making process.
Clearly, by international comparison, the South African exclusivity protections for Telkom, and 
the restrictions on VANS development, were at the extreme end of protectionism. The five-year 
transition period of protection was a common period adopted by many countries establishing 
their telecom reform programmes in the late 1990s. With experience on implementation, some 
later shortened the period, to take into account the rapidly changing technologies and growing 
integration of regional and global markets. None have extended the transition period.
4.3.2 Telkom’s Interpretation of the Act   
In May 1999, Telkom complained to SATRA, expressing concern that some VANS providers were 
offering services in violation of Telkom’s exclusivity rights. SATRA, in its response, drew Telkom’s 
attention to certain provisions of the White Paper. The relevant portion of s2.3 reads:
 “This means that in implementing the provisions of the new market structure, the 
Regulator should, when possible, try to move with the technology rather than against it. 
If the Regulator moves too far out of step with the opportunities created by technology, 
it may be difficult to enforce rules and may indirectly encourage extra-legal actions 
by parties within the sector. And without a combination of enforcement and voluntary 
compliance, the consensus will break down” (RSA 1996a, s2.3, p 22)
SATRA was in effect saying that perhaps the balance between exclusivity and liberalisation should 
be reviewed and adjusted, and that in a context of changing technology, voluntary compliance was 
likely to be more effective than enforcement. Telkom did not agree.
In July 1999, Telkom began sending letters to VANS providers insisting that they confirm that 
they were not using the facility capacity leased from Telkom for certain purposes that, in Telkom’s 
view, would violate Telkom’s exclusivity. Telkom set out several elements to its exclusivity claim, 
including:
• “no person may provide any telecommunication facility for conveyance of signals for itself or 
any other person except if the telecommunication facilities are for the exclusive use of the 
provider of the facilities on a single property”;  
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• “facilities obtained from Telkom are to be for the exclusive use of the legal person who obtains 
those facilities”;
• Telkom facilities may not be used “to provide a private network or private network facilities 
to any of your customers, whether to a single customer or in shared mode to more than one 
customer”;
• Telkom facilities may not be used “for the conveyance of data signals between different 
premises of any single customer or to connect different customers to each other, other than 
through Telkom’s public switched telecommunication network”; and
• Telkom facilities may not be used “to bypass Telkom’s PSTN, i.e., to receive a data signal from 
a customer and allow that signal to break out of your private network at any place or point 
other than at the first point of entry to your private network”;
Acceptance of these terms would virtually deny VANS operators any real opportunity to develop 
the VANS that are essential for e-economy services. The terms literally confine VANS operators to 
a small and insignificant portion of the market.
4.3.3 VANS Providers’ Interpretation of the Act
VANS providers’ interpretations of the Telecommunications Act were initially captured in a 
complaint against Telkom to SATRA in August 1999. In support of its charges that Telkom was 
acting anti-competitively by telling VANS customers that non-Telkom VANS providers were offering 
services illegally, and that Telkom was refusing to provide facilities to VANS providers unless 
they confirmed Telkom’s interpretations of the Act regarding its exclusive rights to provide certain 
services, the South African VANS Association (SAVA) responded essentially as follows:
Clause 2.5 of Telkom’s licence gives Telkom the right to contractually bind any VANS provider 
not to obtain facilities from anyone other than Telkom during its exclusivity period, not to resell 
capacity, and not to convey voice. Clause 3.1(e) contains Telkom’s exclusive right to provide 
telecom facilities to VANS providers during the five-year exclusivity period. S40 of the Act contains 
the conditions under which VANS licensees may provide services. SAVA argues that “these 
clauses of Telkom’s license are only enforceable to the extent that they are not ultra vires the 
Act. Clause 2.5 is ultra vires the Act to the extent that it permits Telkom to bind VANS licensees 
to restrictions beyond those found in the Act” (SAVA 1999a, p 4) “Clause 3.1(e) is ultra vires to 
the extent that it purports to fetter the discretion provided to the Minister in section 40(2) of the Act 
to set a date beyond which telecommunications facilities no longer have to be provided or made 
available by Telkom to VANS licensees” (SAVA 1999a, p 3). In other words, VANS providers can’t 
bind themselves contractually to commit to obtain facilities from Telkom indefinitely, when the Act 
envisages a time to be specified by the Minister when this will no longer be the case.
In addition, SAVA argued that “the provisions in Telkom’s licence do not provide Telkom with the 
requisite authority to refuse facilities for failure on the part of VANS licensees to submit to Telkom’s 
interpretation.” SAVA also wrote up a set of terms to which VANS providers would agree to bind 
themselves contractually in facilities leasing agreements (SAVA, 1999b, pp 15-16), and argued 
that requests for facilities could only be held to be unreasonable by the regulator (SATRA) if they 
were not technically feasible, or would not promote the increased public use of telecommunication 
services or the more efficient use of facilities. SAVA went on to provide a detailed deconstruction 
of each of the points Telkom requires in its letters to VANS providers, concluding that Telkom’s 
interpretations of the Act place restrictions on VANS licensees far greater than those provided in 
the Act (SAVA, 1999b).
4.3.4  SATRA’s Interpretation of the Act
In its SAVA/Telkom s53 Determination, issued on 10 September 1999, SATRA found that Telkom 
had been intimidating VANS customers by telling them that VANS providers were acting illegally 
and that their future operations were uncertain. This created an undue preference for Telkom as 
a VANS provider, and an undue discrimination against other VANS providers. SATRA directed 
Telkom to refrain from intimidating VANS customers and to refrain from threatening to terminate 
the existing facilities of VANS providers. 
In its judgement of 26 June 2000, SATRA ruled that section 44(2) of the Act provides for SATRA 
to be the only body that can consider whether a request for facilities is reasonable or not. Telkom 
cannot refuse to provide facilities simply on its own suspicion of illegality. SATRA wrote that such 
refusal would create a situation where Telkom as a competitor in the VANS industry “is given 
an unfettered discretion to assess and decide whether a request submitted by one of its own 
competitors is reasonable or not.”
Unfortunately this did not settle the matter. Telkom took SATRA’s judgment to court on review. 
4.3.5  Following Notices & Guidelines, Rulings & Judgments
Among the guidelines that became subject to dispute were the interconnection and facilities leasing 
guidelines - including leasing fees and charges, quality of service, and delivery times - that SATRA 
was required to draw up as regulations in terms of section 43(3) of the Act. SATRA finalised the 
guidelines in 1999, and sent them to the Communications Minister for approval, as required by 
the Act. The Minister approved and published the guidelines in March 2000, but then arbitrarily 
withdrew them a month later by notice in the Government Gazette. During the course of 2000, the 
new regulator, ICASA, made certain decisions on a dispute over an interconnection agreement 
between mobile data provider Wireless Business Services (WBS) and Telkom, but Telkom took 
ICASA’s decisions on judicial review. As part of the review, the Pretoria High Court ruled that the 
Minister did not have the power to make or un-make regulations in terms of the Act, and held that 
the regulator’s facilities leasing guidelines were valid. 
A related dispute concerned the boundary between Telkom’s PSTS rights and the provision of 
Internet access. In 1997, Telkom made claims that its exclusivity gave it the sole right to provide 
access to the Internet, and that large first-tier Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were encroaching on 
its exclusive rights by providing Internet access to small second-tier ISPs. In October 1997, SATRA 
supported the ISPs’ rights, making a pronouncement to the effect that “IP [Internet Protocol] is to be 
provided under a VANS licence under section 40 of the Act.” Telkom challenged the legal validity of 
this pronouncement in court. The judge agreed that there were procedural problems with the way in 
which the pronouncement had been made. But, instead of simply setting the pronouncement aside, 
the judge wanted to hear the merits of the argument.
This case has subsequently not gone any further in the court. Internet service provision continues 
to be regulated as a VANS offering -- even though Telkom would like Internet access to fall within 
the boundaries of its PSTS, and the Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) would prefer 
Internet service provision to be deregulated, with only Internet access providers needing to be 
licensed. 
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When the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and SATRA merged to form ICASA in July 
2000, ICASA continued with the VANS regulation-making process begun by SATRA. On 1 June 
2001, ICASA released it findings on the VANS Regulatory Framework, and forwarded a new VANS 
definition to the Minister for inclusion in the proposed Telecommunications Amendment Bill. ICASA 
also sent a set of VANS licensing regulations to the Minister, which were finally approved in 2003.
With respect to a debate about a new sub-classification of service, Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs), ICASA found that a VPN is “manifested as desirable service characteristics resulting 
from software-based technological intervention in the management, configuration and operation 
of a VANS, which is a legal service in terms of section 40 of the Act” (ICASA, 2001). In other 
words, a VPN represents an advance in technology made possible by the introduction of digital 
packet-switching, which makes use of computers to configure and organise traffic over a telecom 
network and adds value in various ways, such as providing increased privacy, security, redundancy 
and reliability to data travelling over a complex array of electronic networks. This has value for a 
range of businesses in the national and global economy, such as banks, airlines, hotels and any 
commercial enterprise operating across cities and countries in the global market.
When the Telecommunications Amendment Bill was released for comment later in 2001, it contained 
Telkom’s definition of a VPN, which clearly stated it was not a VANS offering. So the stage was set 
for a battle in Parliament, before the Portfolio Committee on Communications, over the provisions 
of the Telecommunications Amendment Bill affecting the VANS industry. Representatives of the 
VANS industry reached a conclusion that cumulatively the combination of amendments contained 
in the Bill regarding the VANS industry would amount to the expropriation of their property, in 
violation both of the South African Constitution and the South African Government’s World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) obligations. The VANS industry further indicated that it would take the Bill 
on review to the Constitutional Court if the Bill were passed without changes to the disputed 
provisions. It was in this context that concessions were made to the Bill. Truncated versions of 
ICASA’s VANS definition were included. 
But the controversy over interpretation of the boundaries of a VANS licence continued. Telkom 
withheld facilities from US operator AT&T for provision of VANS services in South Africa. In June 
2002, ICASA ruled that Telkom had acted illegally by unilaterally withholding facilities from AT&T. 
This Telkom/AT&T ruling by ICASA is now subject to judicial review, on appeal by Telkom.
In its pronouncement on the Internet and its VPN enquiry findings, ICASA also found that new 
technological developments, which were not fully crystallised at the time of the introduction of the 
Act in 1996  -- such as Internet Protocol and Virtual Private Networks -- are to be regulated as 
VANS. 
4.3.6  Analysis
Telkom has sought, during the period of transition to a liberalised market, to interpret the boundary 
of its exclusivity as broadly as possible. This was most evident in its attempt to extend its PSTS 
rights to include Internet access provision. If SATRA had agreed to Telkom’s interpretation of its 
exclusive rights regarding the Internet, competition in the Internet component of the VANS sector 
would have been substantially reduced. If ICASA had agreed with Telkom’s views on VPNs, 
competition in the VANS sector would have been eliminated. 
However, the architecture of the Telecommunications Act, and the telecommunications policy 
underlying it, provided both for the regulation of a monopoly PSTS provider and for the regulation 
of a competitive VANS industry. This architecture recognised that technological development in 
telecom was in a dynamic phase of innovation, and that boundaries could not be set in stone at an 
arbitrary point in time. The list of VANS activities permitted under the Act in section 40 was not a 
closed set – it could be added to as technological developments required. Both the White Paper 
and the Act specified that the regulator should perform this updating role, as an impartial arbiter. 
Innovation was recognised as an important factor for growth in the telecom sector, and this is what 
Telkom, as a monopoly, has attempted to stifle at every turn.
VPNs are an innovation brought about by sophisticated utilisation of digitalisation and packet-
switched technology. They enable certain data functions crucial to business efficiency to be 
undertaken at enhanced levels of privacy, security, redundancy and reliability. This form of 
innovation adds value to business in an era of globalisation, by enabling enterprises to manipulate 
data flows more effectively and more quickly. This set of processes, in turn, adds value to the 
South African economy, by making the economy as a whole better able to compete in the global 
economy. By using its monopoly power illegally, Telkom has sought to retard the growth of the 
VANS and Internet sector, and to interfere with the effectiveness of South African business, which 
requires the best value-added electronic data services, nationally and across the world. 
Various reasons can be advanced for the failure of the regulator or the Government to rein 
Telkom in and curb its illegal withholding of facilities from VANS providers. One can point to the 
inexperience of a new regulator in a sector that had previously been regulated by Telkom. One 
can point to a conflict of interest at the level of Government, where the Minister of Communications 
was simultaneously responsible for Government’s shareholding in Telkom and for the policy 
and legislation governing the sector as a whole. One can point to the shortcomings of the dual 
regulatory system -- in which the Minister must approve the regulator’s regulations -- as a factor 
disrupting the regulation of the sector, as evidenced by the case of SATRA’s facilities leasing 
guidelines. Whatever the reasons, it appears that Telkom has been able to exercise its dominance 
of the market unchecked. 
4.4  South African VANS Market Structure
4.4.1  Competition Commission Disputes
More recently, the disputes between the VANS sector and Telkom have been extended to the South 
African Competition Commission. Unable to get effective redress through the sector regulator, 
SAVA has taken its concerns about Telkom’s anti-competitive behaviour to the Commission, in 
essence claiming that competition, innovation and market development are being uneconomically 
and unfairly constrained by Telkom’s monopoly power.
The SAVA complaint with the Commission was filed on 7 May 2002, to coincide with the expiration 
of Telkom’s five-year exclusivity period. The complaint relates to Telkom’s alleged refusal to 
provide telecommunications facilities to VANS providers; to provide access facilities to VANS 
customers; and to peer with those offering Internet services. SAVA also alleges that Telkom has 
discriminated against certain VANS providers in the pricing of leased lines, and has both bundled 
and cross-subsidised its competitive and monopoly services. Telkom has denied these allegations 
and contested the relief measures sought by SAVA, which include the unbundling of Telkom’s 
competitive services and even Telkom divestiture of its VANS services.
SAVA argues that the alleged anti-competitive acts emanate from Telkom’s position as both a 
monopoly supplier of PSTS and a competitive supplier of VANS. Telkom has a monopoly in the 
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upstream network facilities market and is a competitor in the downstream VANS market, allowing 
it to use its monopoly power in the one market to restrict opportunities for independent VANS 
operators to provide service in the other.
4.4.2  Analysis
In competition law terms, the relevant markets in which Telkom and the VANS providers operate 
are somewhat unique, in that they are defined primarily by telecommunication law and government 
policy. The ongoing disputes of the past five years have been, in significant part, over how the 
market is to be defined. The VANS providers see a large market; Telkom sees a much smaller 
one.
Up until now, in the absence of a Second National Operator (SNO), Telkom has been the only 
operator licenced to provide the network facilities that must be used for the communication 
component (i.e., the conveyance of communication) of all services -- basic voice services on 
the public switched network and all VANS. Telkom has also been the only licensed provider of 
basic public voice services, while at the same time having a VANS licence. The essential primary 
resource input for the provision of VANS is the basic communication facilities that must be obtained 
from Telkom, and this input typically represents more than half the total cost of a VANS offering. 
The supply of telecom network facilities to provide communication capacity is the upstream market. 
There is no dispute about the fact that Telkom has had a monopoly over facilities that are essential 
for the provision of VANS. Licences to operate VANS must be obtained from the regulator, and 
they cover the provision of VANS in the national market. There are several hundred firms with 
VANS licenses, including Telkom. They compete for the national business of providing large 
and small organisations with managed data networks and related e-economy services; providing 
organisations and individuals with Internet services; and providing other value-added network 
services. This is the downstream market.
Section 40(3a) of the Telecommunications Act prohibits the carrying of voice through VANS: “No 
person who provides a value-added network service shall permit that service to be used for the 
carrying of voice until a date to be fixed by the Minister by notice in the Gazette.” This prohibition is 
extended to Telkom’s VANS subsidiaries. The disputes between the VANS providers and Telkom 
relate principally to the boundaries of the VANS market, the classification of VANS business, and 
Telkom’s exercise of monopoly power in the upstream essential facilities market to foreclose market 
opportunities from competitors in the downstream VANS market. This makes the measurement of 
the size of the VANS market, and of market shares, a matter of dispute. The question then arises 
as to whether Telkom has a dominant share of the market. If the data-service revenues that Telkom 
classifies among its monopoly PSTS offerings (which would be classified as VANS if provided by 
other operators) are included in the total, then Telkom’s VANS market share constitutes around 
60%. The entire VANS market is actually a wholesale market for Telkom, though Telkom clearly 
does not see it as a market to be cultivated.
The disputes are aggravated by the fact that, with modern telecommunication technologies, 
Telkom is able to provide VANS data services through either its VANS offerings or as part of its 
monopoly public network services. Similarly, the technologies (mostly software) used by VANS 
providers to create the “value-added” components of their services could also be used to include 
basic communication capability, and even voice services. The technologies associated with 
digital networks and converged telecommunication services have made the distinction between 
PSTS and VANS entirely artificial, imposing technologically obsolete and economically inefficient 
restrictions on all service providers and customers.
5. Conclusions
It does not really matter where one stands on all of the disputes that have plagued South African 
VANS development over the last five years. South African e-economy and information society 
development have suffered immensely, and the ongoing disputes are now entirely pointless. 
Technological advances have obliterated the technical distinctions on which the VANS definition 
was established. The period for policy and regulatory application of the VANS distinctions was 
completed on 7 May 2002. Consumers, and any economic definition of the market, draw no 
distinctions between VANS and other kinds of communication services. 
This paper should be about a sad history that is now thankfully behind South Africa. But it isn’t. 
The aggressive application of the monopoly power of Telkom was not terminated on 7 May 2002. 
Telkom continues to dispute attempts by ICASA to regulate it, attempts by the VANS sector 
to exploit the sector’s dynamic innovative potential, and attempts by policy makers to restrain 
Telkom’s immense economic and political power. This pathology of conflict has put the sector in 
gridlock with respect to the long-term goals of e-economy and information society development.
The solution to the vicious cycle created by the ongoing disputes between Telkom and the VANS 
industry is one that can only be addressed at the level of policy. The solution must include a 
clarified telecom policy for a converged communication environment that strengthens the powers 
of the regulator significantly, and/or action by the Competition Tribunal to neutralise Telkom’s 
anti-competitive activities. For a start, now that Telkom’s period of exclusivity has expired, it is 
appropriate that the following restrictions on the VANS market – as structured in section 40 of the 
Telecommunications Act -- be removed:
• The section 40(2) provision that VANS must obtain their telecommunications facilities from 
Telkom -- and the Second National Operator (SNO) -- until a date to be fixed by the Minister 
by notice in the Government Gazette;
• The section 40(3) provision that no person who provides a VANS shall permit that service to be 
used for the carrying of voice until a date to be set by the Minister by notice in the Government 
Gazette;
• The section 40(4) provision that VANS providers may not re-sell leased facilities to third 
parties until a date to be fixed by the Minister by notice in the Government Gazette.
These restrictions can all be lifted immediately by the stroke of the Minister’s pen.
In a converged communication environment, a dynamic VANS market will be stimulated if a clear 
distinction is drawn between the provision of facilities and services. Telkom must be forced to 
make this separation in a transparent manner that can be monitored by an effective regulator. This 
separation could be included in the forthcoming convergence legislation, or it could be mandated 
by the Competition Tribunal, or both. Surely now is the time for South Africa to create a significantly 
expanded VANS sector  -- a sector that can innovate the foundation services needed for South 
Africa’s e-economy and information society. 
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